Professor Rudi te Velde’s keynote address, “Signatum EST Superos: Participation and Natural Law,” explores Thomas Aquinas’s foundational text on natural law, Lex naturalis found in the Summa Theologiae. Te Veldi acknowledges the vast amount of scholarship on natural law over the last 800 years, but argues for a closer look at Aquinas’s specific use of the concept of participation.
Te Velde begins by presenting Aquinas’s definition: natural law is “nothing else than the participation of the Eternal law in the rational creature”. This means natural law is the eternal law as it is participated in by the specific creature endowed with reason (ourselves).
A core concern of the address is the misinterpretation often found in contemporary literature, which reformulates the definition to say that natural law participates in the eternal law. This shift, according to te Velde, emphasizes a theological dependence where natural law is viewed as needing to be related to God’s transcendent law to fulfill its normative role. Such readings often stress the dependence on Divine wisdom and betray a lack of trust in human reason.
Te Velde proposes a reading with a dual focus: the relationship between the eternal law and natural law, and the relationship between nature (what we are) and reason. He suggests that the three constitutive dimensions of natural law—law of reason, law of nature, and law of God—should be viewed as different depth dimensions of a single law, the law of reason.
The key to understanding Aquinas’s formulation lies in the context surrounding the quote from Psalm 4: “The light of your face, O Lord, is shined upon us” (signatum EST superos). Te Velde explains that signatum means “marked, inscribed, impressed”. Participation is used here in the sense of receiving an impression (impressio) that becomes part of our created nature.
This interpretation emphasizes a downward movement. The impression of God’s light is received not in a superficial way, but as a natural light that constitutes us in our own intellectual nature*. This total dependency (creation) leads to an imminent order, enabling human beings to know the truth by themselves and discern good and evil. Thus, the natural law is the light of practical reason that constitutes man in his moral agency, allowing for rational self-government.
Rational creatures participate in God’s Providence in an excellent way because they not only are ruled by it but also rule themselves in their acts. This participation is self-reflective, taking the form of the light of practical reason in which the first normative principles are naturally known.
Te Velde also addresses the role of natural inclinations, which serve to specify the first precept of practical reason: “do what is good and avoid what is bad.” Inclinations are not external facts or mere biological urges; rather, they are included in every freely willed act. Crucially, inclinations only become normative principles when they are apprehended by reason as good. For example, the inclination to preserve life becomes the precept “thou shalt not kill” because reason acknowledges life as a fundamental good. To choose suicide, therefore, involves a practical contradiction, as it cancels the basic value (life) that serves as the ground and meaning for all other values.
In conclusion, Te Velde contends that the two modern alternatives—natural law without eternal law (secularism) or natural law intrinsically dependent on eternal law (theonomy)—are based on a false assumption. There is no natural law without eternal law, because natural law is the Eternal law as participated in the rational creature. The normative force stems from the light of practical reason reflecting this eternal Law, guiding human self-government.